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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second District Court denying Mr. 
Sullivan's motion to set aside an order dismissing Ms. Sullivan's divorce 
complaint filed on September 26, 2002 (Case No. 024701693 DA) (hereinafter the 
"First Complaint"), refusing to consolidate the case with Ms. Sullivan's later-filed 
divorce action (Case No. 034700173 DA)(hereinafter the "Second Complaint"), 
and finding that the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in Case No. 034700173 DA to 
determine custody issues. The original order was entered on September 22, 2003, 
and an amended order was entered on October 28, 2003. This court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h) and Rule 3(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint and 
allowing her to proceed under her Second Complaint when the jurisdiction under 
the UCCJEA was determined at the time of filing of the First Complaint? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial 
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court. Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f 2, 20 P.3d 895. 
Issue Preserved: Record p.l 18, interior pages 3 (lines 9 through 21), 4 
(lines 2 through 7), 6 (lines 6 through 22), 7 (lines 8 through 12), 9 (lines 20 
through 25), and 10 (lines 1 through 9). 
2. Did Mr. Sullivan file his action in Illinois in a timely manner? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. Smith Inv. Co. v. 
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior page 4 (lines 2 through 24) and 
interior page 15 (lines 15 through 20); Record pages 257 and 258. 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that Ms. Sullivan did not act 
surreptitiously or wrongfully by taking the parties' children from the State of 
Illinois under false pretenses, and in not declining jurisdiction by reason of her 
conduct? 
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to 
the facts present mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error and conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving the trial 
court some discretion in applying the lawr to the facts. In re G.B., 2002 UT App 
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270,111, 53 P.3d 963. 
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior pages 8 and 9; Record, p. 256 and 
257. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Rules 41(a)(2)(ii) and 42, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; U.C.A. § 78-
45c-208. 
2. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UUCCJEA), §§ 78-45c-102(7), 201(l)(a through (d), and other applicable 
sections; Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (IUCCJA), Illinois Revised 
Statutes, 750-5/601, et seq., and 750-35/1, et seq.\ Parental Kidnaping Prevention 
Act (PKPA), 11 U.S.C. § 1738A (c). 
3. U.C.A. §78-45c-110(l). 
4. U.C.A. § 78-45c-208. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married in August 1995 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and 
have a son, Brett, born on April 2, 1996, and a daughter, Sydney, born on July 18, 
1997. The parties moved to Illinois in December 1999 and were living in 
Thompsonville, Illinois, in June, 2002. On or about June 26, 2002, Ms. Sullivan 
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took the children with her to Idaho on the pretext that she was going to visit her 
family. She then took the children to Utah and filed her First Complaint for 
divorce on September 26, 2002. Mr. Sullivan was served with the First Complaint 
on or about November 27, 2002, and filed an answer on December 27, 2002, 
contesting the Utah court's jurisdiction and asserting that Illinois had jurisdiction 
as the home state pursuant to the UCCJEA, since the children had lived in Illinois 
for more than six months before Ms. Sullivan left the State. Mr. Sullivan 
thereafter filed a custody proceeding in Illinois on April 7, 2003. In the interim, 
Ms. Sullivan filed the Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, claiming 
that she had been in Utah for six months and that Utah now qualified as the home 
state. When Mr. Sullivan moved to consolidate the two divorce proceedings under 
the earlier filed case, Ms. Sullivan objected and moved to dismiss her first 
complaint. The Utah trial court mistakenly dismissed the Ms. Sullivan's first 
complaint before the time for briefing had elapsed. Following a hearing, however, 
the Court allowed the dismissal to stand, found that Mr. Sullivan had waited too 
long to file his complaint in Illinois, and found the Utah had jurisdiction over the 
matter. Mr. Sullivan appeals from the dismissal of Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint 
and the trial court's holding that Utah had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on August 26, 1995, in New Mexico, and have 
two minor children, Brett Sullivan, age 8, and Sydney Sullivan, age 6. The parties 
and their minor children resided in Illinois between December 1999 and July 
2002. Record, pp. 201 and 202, paragraphs 2 and 5; 
2. On or about June 20, 2002, Ms. Sullivan surreptitiously left Illinois with 
the children, claiming that she was going to Idaho to attend a family reunion and 
that she would return to Illinois. She thereafter went to Utah. Record, pp. 119. 
3. Ms. Sullivan claimed repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah 
temporarily. Mr. Sullivan thought her stay in Utah was temporary and that she 
would return to Illinois. Mr. Sullivan Record, p. 224; p. 119, p. 188, interior page 
6, lines 12 through 15. 
4. Ms. Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce in the Second District 
Court, Farmington Department, on September 26, 2002, Civil No. 024701693 DA. 
Record, p. 201-212. 
5. Mr. Sullivan was served with the First Complaint in Illinois on 
November 27, 2002. Record, p. 222. He filed an answer on December 27, 2002 
(hereinafter the "First Answer") disputing the Utah court's jurisdiction and 
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requesting that all proceedings relating to custody of the minor children be 
referred to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, Illinois, in McLeansboro, 
Illinois. Record, p. 223-226. 
6. Ms. Sullivan filed her Second Complaint on January 28, 2003, Civil No. 
034700173. Record, pp. 1-5. The Second Complaint was served on Mr. Sullivan 
on March 19, 2003. Record, p. 9. 
7. Mr. Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003, in the 
Second Judicial Circuit Court for Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5. 
Record, pp. 112-116; pp. 245-252. 
8. Mr. Sullivan filed an Answer to the Petitioner's Second Complaint on 
April 22, 2003 (hereinafter "the Second Answer"). Record, pp. 117-120. At the 
same time, he also filed a Motion to Consolidate the two divorce actions under the 
earlier-filed civil number pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 4-107 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (now part of Rule 
42), or in the alternative to dismiss the later-filed complaint. Record, pp. 232-233. 
9. On or about April 29, 2003, Ms. Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss the 
First Complaint and her objection to Mr. Sullivan's motion to consolidate. 
Record, pp 234-237. 
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10. On or about May 2, 2003, Ms. Sullivan submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Illinois court by filing her general appearance and answer in case number 03-
F-5. Record, p. 194. 
11. On May 15, 2003, the Utah trial court prematurely entered an order 
dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint (hereinafter "the Dismissal Order"). 
Record, p. 253. The trial court later concluded that the Dismissal Order was 
untimely. See Amended Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order 
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint (hereinafter "the Amended Order of Denial"). 
Record, p. 146, paragraph 3. 
12. On May 28, 2003, Mr. Sullivan filed a motion to set aside the Dismissal 
Order with a supporting memorandum. Record, pp. 259-267. 
13. A hearing was held on August 7, 2003, before the Honorable Darwin C. 
Hansen on Mr. Sullivan's motion to set aside the Dismissal Order and motion to 
consolidate Ms. Sullivan's two divorce cases. Record, p. 273 and p. 188 
(transcript). At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Hansen declined to set aside 
the Dismissal Order because he found that Mr. Sullivan had not taken steps to 
proceed in Illinois within six months of Ms. Sullivan leaving Illinois. Judge 
Hansen found that the Utah court had jurisdiction of the custody issues relating to 
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the parties' minor children. Record, page 146, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3; p. 188, 
interior page 19. 
14. The Utah court entered its Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside Order Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint on September 22, 2003. Record, 
p. 277. Mr. Sullivan's Notice of Appeal was filed on October 22, 2003. Record, 
p. 148. An Amended Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order 
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint was entered on October 28, 2003. Record, p. 
145. 
15. On December 30, 2003, Mr. Sullivan filed an Emergency Petition for 
Temporary Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois. Record, p. 163. On 
December 31, 2003, The Illinois court, Honorable Barry L. Vaughan presiding, 
issued an Order for Temporary Child Custody finding that Illinois was the home 
state of the parties' minor children at the commencement of Ms. Sullivan's divorce 
action in September 2002, and that the Utah court had erred in not staying its 
proceeding and in not communicating with the Illinois court upon learning that 
Mr. Sullivan had a pending Illinois custody action. The Illinois court awarded Mr. 
Sullivan temporary custody pending further proceedings. Record, pp. 170 and 
171. The Illinois court entered a preliminary injunction on January 5, 2004, but 
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changed its position after a telephone conference with Judge Hansen on January 8, 
2004, and entered an order vacating the preliminary injunction. Record, pp. 172-
174. 
16. Certain Illinois court documents are not part of the Utah court file, but 
may be important for the Court to consider in this action and are therefore filed 
with the Addendum to this Brief. They include the Partial Transcript of 
Videotaped Telephone Conference of Judge Hansen's and Judge Vaughan's 
conversation on January 8, 2004, and the Rule 23 Order of the Appellate Court of 
Illinois, Fifth District, entered on May 21, 2004, affirming Judge Vaughan's order 
setting aside the preliminary injunction. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the 
Illinois action was effectively stayed pending this Court's decision on Mr. 
Sullivan's appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in allowing Ms. Sullivan to proceed with her Second 
Complaint when her First Complaint did not establish home state jurisdiction 
under the UCCJEA. She was not entitled to commence her case again to cure the 
jurisdictional deficiency. The trial court should have consolidated the First 
Complaint and Second Complaint or dismissed the Second Complaint as a 
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duplication of the first. Mr. Sullivan actively contested jurisdiction in the Utah 
court and requested that jurisdictional issues be referred to the Illinois court. The 
Utah court made no determination about jurisdiction until after the Illinois 
proceeding was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint 
and in Allowing Her to Proceed With Her Second Complaint. 
A. Utah Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA. 
When Ms. Sullivan filed her First Complaint on September 26, 2002, she 
and the parties' children had been in Utah for less than three months. Pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 78-45c-201(l)(a), "a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial 
child custody determination only if this state is the home state of the child on the 
date of the commencement of the proceeding...." [Emphasis added]. "Home 
state" is defined in § 78-45c-102(7) as "the state in which a child lived with a 
parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months 
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." Both Ms. 
Sullivan and the Utah trial court acknowledged that the Utah court did not have 
jurisdiction of the First Complaint under the UCCJEA. Illinois, where the parties 
and their children had lived for almost three years, where Mr. Sullivan continued 
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to reside, where the children had a significant connection, and where there was 
substantial evidence about the children's care, schooling and relationships, was the 
children's home state. 
Rather than defer to the jurisdiction of Illinois,, Ms. Sullivan attempted to 
bootstrap jurisdiction by filing a Second Complaint on January 28, 2003, 
purpor tedly be> ond the six iiioi ill: i. time pe- :m, ,;,. . . moving to disn liss the 
1 nil I I  nuiipljiiil 1 In1 I lull mil i iiiiiiiiHltnl t nil mi III dismissing 1111• Fir I 
< ' 11111111' i i n I in in i I I i 111 if) w i mi i" Ms S11111 v in n 1 i i li; P r • i second bit* - • • • - -
Court should have consolidated the two actions under the earlier-filed pleading, or 
dismissed the Second Complaint as duplicative. Section 78-45c-201(l)(a) very 
clearly allows a Utah court to make an initial custody determination only if Utah is 
the home state when the proceeding is commenced. 
B, The Trial Cour t Should Have Consolidated the Two Divorce 
Cases dismissed the Duplicative Second Complaint . 
f 
Judicial Administration and then Rule 4-107 ui in < •• * M:.< ' 
Administration to consolidate Ms. Sullivan's two divorce cases under the earlier-
filed case number,, or in the alternative to dismiss the Second C- - = pl.ib' T" 
Sullivan objected to consolidation or dismissal of the Second Complaint, claiming 
that she would be prejudiced by such action. However, Mr. Sullivan is the party 
prejudiced by the trial court's failure to consolidate the two cases. Clearly Ms. 
Sullivan was attempting to manipulate jurisdiction under the UCCJEA by trying to 
commence her action again, after failing to meet UCCJEA jurisdictional 
requirements with her First Complaint. She was not a position to object to 
consolidation. In Raggenbuck v.Suhrmann, 325 P.2d 258 (Utah 1958), the court 
upheld a trial court's order to consolidate eleven food poisoning cases, finding that 
the order "did not violate any constitutional or statutory provision," and was not 
prejudicial to the defendants. Id. at 259-260. In the present situation, Ms. 
Sullivan prejudiced herself by filing her First Complaint when Utah was not the 
children's home state. The Second Complaint does not remedy Ms. Sullivan's 
failure to establish jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the trial court must 
look to the date the proceeding was originally commenced by the First Complaint. 
II. Mr. Sullivan Filed His Custody Action in a Timely Manner. 
A. Mr. Sullivan's Delay in Filing in Illinois Does Not Give Utah 
Jurisdiction or Deprive Illinois of Jurisdiction. 
Mr. Sullivan filed his custody action in Illinois on April 7, 2003. He had 
previously contested jurisdiction of Ms. Sullivan's First and Second Complaints 
and had asserted that Illinois was the children's home state. At the time the Utah 
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court held its August 7, 2003, hearing on Mr. ^uiiivan b motion to set aside the 
dismissal of Ms. SuilnaL o First Complaint, the Utah court had been made aware 
of Mr, Sullivan's pending Illinois action. Even if the Utah court believed Mr. 
Sullivan filed beyond the 6-month period under U.C.A. § 78-45c~201 (1 Va\ it 
should have found undoi . - - i)(b) that I Jtah was not tia nome state and 
11 in, in I I I I in mi ii*. s was (hi1 moii itp|>ju|iiMk Iniuin hcutu-.c llln i hi Id kin had a signili iiiilll 
( i > 1 1 1 i n l i o n \ \ in III in ill II II 11 ii I in i s ., m 1 1 1 1 s i n I > s I „ 1 1 1 1 m a I r \ i n I n 1 1 ' i l • \ „ i s ., i ^  „ 1 1 1 „ i h 11 • m m i 1 1 1 m 1 1 « i i s 
regarding the children's care, iMotivtm*; ir.-nn --. •.1 personal relationships. 
In In re Custody ofBozarth, 538 N.E.2d 785 (111. App.2 Dist. 1989), the 
Illinois Appellate Court considered a situation, where an Illinois residen r " ' » 
object to a Washington court's exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The 
Illinois appellate court, overturned the lower court's deferral to the W ashington 
i I I I mi I I and he lill as lul'lun s, 
jurisdiction, nor does the fact that one court nas . w e e d e d in issuing a 
custody order sooner than another court endow it with jurisdiction \\ w u, c> 
not meet the requirements of the Act. In short, McKerr's failure to object to 
the paternity action in Washington and that court's haste in issuing an 
unsupported custody order sooner than another court endow it with 
, .• jurisdiction if it does not meet the requirements of the Act." Id. at 792., 
In the present case, even if Mr. Sullivan were considered slow- to act in filing his 
13 
custody action in Illinois, the Illinois court has a superior claim to jurisdiction 
because Utah did not have jurisdiction when Ms. Sullivan filed her First 
Complaint and the children's established residence was in Illinois. If neither state 
could be considered the home state, the other factors under § 78-45c--201(l)(b) 
favored Illinois as the state with the closest ties to the children. 
B. Ms. Sullivan's Temporary Absence from Illinois Should Have 
Been Included in Calculating the Six-Month Period of Residence 
in Illinois. 
Ms. Sullivan told Mr. Sullivan repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah 
temporarily and that she was planning to return with the children to Illinois. 
Under the UCCJEA, § 78-45c-102(7), a period of temporary absence is part of the 
six-month period. Therefore, any periods of time during which the children were 
temporarily absent from Illinois, based on representations that Ms. Sullivan was 
planning to return with them to Illinois, are added to and extend the six-month 
period of time. In the case In re Marriage of Richardson, 625 N.E.2d 1122 (111. 
App. 3 Dist. 1993), the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois considered a 
situation where a mother who had lived in Illinois with her child for almost a year 
claimed that she met the 6-month requirement of the Illinois UCCJA. The Court 
found that the mother's stay with the child in Illinois had been temporary and that 
-14-
Califoi i lia i ei i: laii led 111: le 1 101 i le state • ::)f tl le • ;:! ill ::! 1 1 1 s II 
that '"temporary absence' does not connote a particular length of time, unuti 
appropriate circumstances, the term can appl) 10 a penou ^i nu:.} montn^. A<. at 
1124, citing Lidonnki ~- is, 16 F.2d 532, 534 (D.C.Cir. 1926) Likewise, 
because of her repeated representations to Mr Sullivan that she was planning to 
return to Illinois ,vi- .mi v^n > Vm> m I lati - .w, e^ considered temporary, at 
Least ii ,. . ...... ... .. *,. .^ ;;, ;~,.. ..., , . - u • 
Sec on 
since i t v a s f i l i a l f\MM IIII'IIH miiIIIIIi < ; i l l i i III ' I i r s l ( ' i i m | i l . i i n l 
III Ms. Sullivan Took the Children From Illinois Under False Pretenses. 
Under § 78-45c-208(l), the court is require. me jurisdiction if the 
party asserting jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct. In this case,, Ms 
Sullivan took the children with her to Idaho on the pretext of attending a family 
reunion, She repeatedly represented u> *.. - *livan that she would be returning 
Su l l i v .n r ' ! ill I mi1, in f i lm* ' l i r . . i r l inn il l l l l i nn is m In l lmih ' l i t In tsmi l i l lu 
returning with the children to Illinois. The court considered evidence in the 
pleadings and proffers made by Ms. Sullivan, which is marshaled as follows: "KIs. 
'. 1 5 ' , • 
Sullivan made Mr. Sullivan aware of her location in Utah and did not secrete the 
children (Record, p. 188, interior page 12, lines 9-11); Ms. Sullivan had allowed 
recent telephone contacts with the children (Record, p. 188, interior page 12, lines 
3 through 8); Ms. Sullivan received cards from Mr. Sullivan's mother 
acknowledging receipt of cards from the children (Record, p. 188, interior page 
11, lines 23-25 and page 12, lines 1-3); and Ms. Sullivan talked with Mr. Sullivan 
(Record p. 188, interior page 12, lines 11-12). 
Despite this marshaled evidence, the trial court erred in finding that Ms. 
Sullivan did not act unjustifiably. She did not deny that she left Illinois with the 
children under false pretenses or that she repeatedly assured Mr. Sullivan that she 
planned to return to Illinois with the children. She should not be allowed to 
benefit from her misrepresentations, which were among the reasons Mr. Sullivan 
held off filing in Illinois. Ms. Sullivan's conduct was unjustifiable and the trial 
court should have declined jurisdiction for that reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sullivan should not be allowed to circumvent the clear language of the 
UCCJEA by filing the same complaint twice. She should be held to the 
commencement date created by filing her First Complaint on September 26, 2002. 
-16-
Since f ' -
deferred to the jurisdiction of the Illii iois mini i ill! >iilln .111 '' IHII ill 11 i 
filing in Illinois was timely under the UCCJEA. Ms. Sullivan made repeated 
representations that her absence from Illinois was temporary, which extended the 
six-month period for Illinois to be considered the home state to the time of Mr. 
n,\ N ;... -i.. luduu, .-,,„ ,,,. - ,,, "^.mt should have declined jurisdiction 
.i^ i .oiiJUc; ii removing the children from 
Illinois undet :. •>• t - . . ia reverse 
the trial court s dismissal ? \t • ! I i 
the First and Second Complaints uiidei ilie earlier ii.-- ^ > 
exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and should defer to UK, jurisdiction ui the 
Illinois court 
DATED this j£_ day of June, 2004. 
KING, isURKB & SCHAAP. PC 
^
 4
 // 
Tl IOMAS R\ KING 
Attorneys for Respondent' \nm5!' 
fa 
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ADDLNDLM 
Rules . .v^j(2)(ii) and 42, Uiuh Rules of Civil Procedure 1 
Rule 4 107. Utah Rules of Judicial Administratis *> 
TTniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act U.C.A. § 78-45c-102. 110. 201(l)(a). and 
y,< ' 
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act 11 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) 14 
Partial I ransi i ipt of N nlrolapcd 11• I«.*| • 11• • 11• ('onfeirnic I I Still 16 
Rule 23 Order (5/21/04) 54 
i m 
125 UTAH RUI.ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 
v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914 (1909). 
Refusal to grant continuance in personal in-
jury case was an abuse of discretion where 
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial be-
cause of his physical condition, there was no 
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiff's testimony was essential to his 
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962). 
Defendant was not prejudiced by court's re-
fusal to grant a continuance after defendant 
herself had stated that her illness probably 
would not impair her ability to function at the 
trial other than by causing her some discomfort 
and the trial court made provisions to accom-
modate defendant in case the illness forced her 
to leave suddenly. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 
585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Discretion of court. 
Denial of motion for continuance was within 
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis 
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924). 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 R2d 1375 (Utah 
1988). 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
The inability of counsel to be present at the 
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle his 
client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 
560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Unavoidable absence. 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
jiven necessary notice, and has made a reason-
ible effort to have the trial date changed for 
food cause, it would be an abuse of discretion 
lot to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. 
lammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
—New theory of case. 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a 
heory of the case suggested after issue joined 
nd before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 393 
L877). 
-Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for contin-
ance in action based on credit card obligation 
rhich had been procedurally delayed for two 
nd a half years by interrogatories and by 
arious motions of the defendant; and although 
trial date had been set for four months, motion 
for continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
— Supporting affidavits. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not 
placed in hands of an officer for service until the 
morning the case was called for trial, though it 
had been set for several weeks, and the witness 
had testified at a former trial, continuance was 
denied. Corporation of Members of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Watson, 30 
Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). 
In malpractice action, motion for continuance 
based on plaintiff's inability to serve subpoena 
on vacationing medical witness was properly 
denied, where plaintiff had made no effort to 
depose witness and had never contacted wit-
ness for the purpose of testifying. Maxfield v. 
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). 
After plaintiff had been granted one contin-
uance because of unavailability of her preferred 
expert witness, and her second request for a 
continuance several months later was solely 
due to her own failure to retain and designate a 
new expert witness in a timely manner, there 
was no abuse in the district court's denial of 
plaintiff's second motion. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 
P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Need. 
Where the defendant's counsel had three 
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, 
were actually present at trial and thus subject 
to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
need for a third witness did not entitle the 
defendant to the granting of a motion for con-
tinuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 
(Utah 1978); Holbrook v. Master Protection 
Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d 
753, cert, denied, — UT —, 59 P.3d 603. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in 
1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, 
L 
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; 
\ C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. 
AX.R. —Admissions to prevent continuance 
civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon 
applicant's payment of costs or expenses in-
curred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Aile 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and 
anv aoDlicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
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adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under 
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is 
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court 
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same 
claim. 
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be 
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; 
or 
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of 
the plaintifFs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the 
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for indepen-
dent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a 
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court 
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provi-
sions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the 
trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dis-
missed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the 
same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and 
may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the 
order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party 
dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursu-
ant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed 
such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy 
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom 
such provisional remedy was obtained. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d) 
of this rule are similar to Rule 41, F.R C.P. 2 
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—•—Second dismissal. 
By its express terms, the two-dismissal rule 
provided in this rule applies only when the 
notice of dismissal is filed twice by the plaintiff 
in the action. Pilcher v. State, Dep't of Social 
Servs., 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
——Quashing of previous summons. 
Where a summons is quashed pursuant to 
Rule 4(b) and plaintiff is subsequently granted 
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision 
(a)(1) of this rule, the two-dismissal rule of 
Subdivision (a)U) of this rule is not applicable. 
Brimhall v. Seagull Inv. Co., 25 Utah 2d 201, 
479 P.2d 468 (1970). 
Cited in Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 
268 P.2d 986 (1954); Bunting Tractor Co. v. 
Emmett D. Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 
272 P2d 191 (1954); K L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656 
P.2d 986 (Utah 1982); Pitman v. Bonham, 677 
R2d 1126 (Utah 1984); State v. Poteet, 692 P2d 
760 (Utah 1984); Burton v. Youngblood, 711 
P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); Meadow Fresh Farms v. 
Utah State Univ. Dept of Agric. & Applied 
Science, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 
P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); C&Y Corp. v. 
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah 
Dep't of Cors., 942 R2d 933 (Utah 1997); Bea-
ver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 
1147; Albrecht v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 64, 44 
R3d 838; Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 
7, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 67 P.3d 466. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Civil Procedure, 2001 Utah L. 
Rev. 1026. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 22; 24 
Am. Jur. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and 
Nonsuit § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit 
§§ 6 to 86. 
AJL.R. — Time when voluntary nonsuit or 
dismissal may be taken as of right under stat-
ute so authorizing at any time before "trial," 
"commencement of trial/'"trial of the facts," or 
the like, 1 A.L.R.3d 711. 
Dismissing action or striking testimony 
where party to civil action asserts privilege 
against self-incrimination as to pertinent ques-
tion, 4 A.L.R.3d 545. 
Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or direction of 
verdict on opening statement of counsel in civil 
action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Dismissal of action because of party's perjury 
xr suppression of evidence, 11 A.L.R.3d 1153. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
imely prosecute action, 15 A.L R.3d 674. 
Right of one spouse, over objection, to volun-
arily dismiss claim for divorce, annulment, or 
imilar marital relief, 16 A.L.R.3d 283. 
Application to period of limitations fixed by 
ontract, of statute permitting new action to be 
rought within specified time after failure of 
rior action for cause other than on the merits, 
6 A.L.R.3d 452. 
Voluntary dismissal of replevin action by 
laintiff as affecting defendant's right to judg-
ment for the return or value of the property, 24 
X.R.3d 768. 
What amounts to "final submission" or "re-
rement of jury" within statute permitting 
'aintiff to take voluntary dismissal or nonsuit 
ithout prejudice before submission or retire-
ment of jury, 31 A.L.R.3d 449. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as 
affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as entitling 
defendant to recover attorneys' fees or costs as 
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66 
A.L.R.3d 1087. 
Propriety of termination of properly initiated 
derivative action by "independent committee" 
appointed by board of directors whose actions 
(or inaction) are under attack, 22 A.L.R.4th 
1206. 
Nature of termination of civil action required 
to satisfy element of favorable termination to 
support action for malicious prosecution, 30 
A.L.R.4th 572. 
What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
dismissal under state statute or court rule 
requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
Construction, as to terms and conditions, of 
state statute or rule providing for voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice upon such terms 
and conditions as state court deems proper, 34 
A.L.R.4th 778. 
Propriety of dismissal under Federal Civil 
Procedure Rule 41(a) of action against less than 
all of several defendants, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 569. 
Judicial qualification of provision of Rule 
4Kb) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply 
with federal rules or court order, certain other 
dismissals, operates as adjudication upon mer-
its, 5A.L.R. Fed. 897. 
Propriety of dismissal for failure of prosecu-
tion under Rule 4Kb) of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 488. 
Uile 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact 
*e pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all 
ie matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; 
iA ;± T^»oxr T-noiro cnrii r»T-rJorQ rnnrpminp" nrocepdiners therein as may tend to 
Rule 42 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 132 
(a)(1) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to 
the first case filed. Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all 
parties in each case. The order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in 
each case. 
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case 
filed shall be used for all subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by the 
judge assigned to the first case. The presiding judge may assign the case to 
another judge for good cause. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, 
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend- Cross-References. — Separate trials ail-
ment added Subdivisions (a)(1) and (2). thorized, U.R.C.R 20(b). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 42, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Condemnation proceedings. 
—Separate parcels of land. 
Consolidation. 
—Adoption proceedings. 
— Issue of liability. 
— Multiple insurers. 
—Unlawful detainer and action to try title. 
Divorce. 
—Bifurcation. 
Separate trials. 
—Appeals. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Separate issues. 
Cited. 
Condemnation proceedings. 
— Separate parcels of land. 
Where condemnation proceedings involved 
three separate parcels of land belonging to 
three separate interests, it was within discre-
tion of trial court to combine cases for trial or to 
grant separate trials. Porcupine Reservoir Co. 
v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 
P.2d 620 (1964). 
Consolidation. 
—Adoption proceedings. 
The trial court properly consolidated two 
adoption petitions regarding the same children 
into one adoption proceeding. L.S.C. v. State, 
1999 UT App 315, 991 P2d 70. 
—Issue of liability. 
It was within discretion of trial court to order 
a consolidation, for trial of issue of liability, of 
eleven actions involving nineteen plaintiffs 
where the order did not violate any constitu-
tional or statutory provision nor was likely to 
be prejudicial to defendants. Raggenbuck v. 
Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 327, 325 R2d 258 (1958). 
— Multiple insurers . 
Actions by plaintiff against five different in-
surance companies to recover loss and damage 
idated since the several policies were separate 
contracts, and actions were not between same 
parties; but consolidation was not prejudicial 
error where no substantial right of any defen-
dant was affected. New York Jobbing House v. 
Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 54 lAah 394, 182 P. 361 
(1919). 
^—Unlawful detainer and action to try ti-
tle. 
Plaintiff's motion in unlawful detainer pro-
ceeding that such proceeding and equitable 
action to try title brought by defendant be 
joined was properly overruled, since defendant 
had right to have issues in unlawful detainer 
proceeding tried by jury, which might not have 
been the case if actions were tried together. 
Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304, 237 P. 217 
(1925). 
Divorce. 
—Bifurcation. 
Bifurcation did not prejudice a husband 
where, although the initial decree gave wife 
sole access to funds in eight bank accounts that 
she controlled, at the time of distribution the 
court could still equitably divide all assets 
owned by the parties at the time the initial 
decree was entered. Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 
565 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Separate trials. 
-^Appeals. 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P 54(b), ap-
plies when the trial court orders a separate 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving 
issues and parties before that court, will de-
prive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v CnnM* sni T>O * — 
(Utah 1991). A 
—Court 's discretion. 
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the trial court and, absent abuse of such discre-
tion, will not be upset on appeal King v 
Barron, 770 P2d 975 (Utah 1988) 
—Separate issues. 
When a court considers it convenient or de-
sirable in the interest of justice, an> separate 
issue may be tried separately Page v Utah 
Home Fire Ins 
290 (1964) 
Co, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P2d 
Cited in Lignell v Berg, 593 P2d 800 (Utah 
1979), Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v 
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs , Inc, 889 P2d 445 
(Utah Ct App 1994), Stevensen v Goodson, 
924 P2d 339 (Utah 1996) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Ju ry Formats and Civil Litigation Arnold v 
Eastern Airlines, 1991 B YU L Rev 1005 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am Jur 2d Actions § 110 
et seq , 75 Am Jur 2d Trial § 115 et seq 
C.J.S. — 1 C J S Actions §§ 109,117 to 122, 
88 C J S Trial §§ 6 to 10 
A.L.R. — Propriety of separate trials of is-
sues of tort liability and of validity and effect of 
release, 4 A L R 3d 456 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing personal injury, death, or property damage, 
78 A L R. Fed 890 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in civil rights 
actions, 79 A L R Fed 220 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions in\ olv-
mg patents and copyrights, 79 A L R Fed 532 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in contract ac-
tions, 79 A L R Fed 812 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in civil rights actions, 81 A L R Fed 732 
Propnety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
m actions involving patents, copyrights, or 
trademarks, 82 A L R Fed 719 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in actions involving securities, 83 A L R Fed 
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Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in 
open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be admitted which is 
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of 
record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective 
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on 
oral testimony or depositions 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 43(a) and (e), F R C P 
Cross-References, — Evidence generally 
§ 78-25-2 et seq 
Relevancy and its limits, U R E 401 to 411 
Witnesses, U R E 601 to 615 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Form 
—Open court 
Judge's request for investigation 
Motions 
—Evidentiary hearing 
Witnesses 
Cited 
Form. 
—Open court. 
Judge's request for investigation. 
Failure of judge in divorce action to notify 
ment of Subdivision (a), that all testimony be in 
open court, to such a degree as to warrant a 
retrial Austad v Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 
P2d 284 (1954) 
Motions. 
—Evidentiary hearing. 
Although a court can grant or deny a motion 
on the sole or combined bases of affidavits, 
depositions or oral testimony, when no deposi-
tions have been taken and disputed material 
facts are alleged in opposing affidavits, there 
should be an evidentiary hearing to aid m the 
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Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In civil law and motion matters, except orders to showr cause and bench 
warrants, matters may be continued upon stipulation of the parties and notice 
to the clerk of the judge to whom the case is assigned, except that when a 
matter has been placed upon the official law and motion calendar, the matter 
may be continued only upon approval of the court. 
(2) In sexual abuse cases involving minor victims, continuances may be 
granted upon a written finding by the court, or written minute entry which 
shall include the reason(s) for the continuance. 
(3) A motion to continue made on or within 10 daj^s prior to the date of a 
hearing may be granted by the court upon a showing of good cause and upon 
such conditions as the court determines to be just, including but not limited to 
the payment of costs and attorney fees. 
(4) If the hearing is an "important criminal justice hearing" or an "important 
juvenile justice hearing" as defined by § 77-38-2 of which the victim has 
requested notification, the court should consider the impact of the continuance 
upon the victim. 
(Amended effective November 15, 1995.) 
Rule 4-106. Electronic conferencing. 
Intent: 
To authorize the use of electronic conferencing in lieu of personal appear-
ances in appropriate cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In the judge's discretion, any hearing may be conducted using telephone 
or video conferencing. 
(2) Any proceeding in which a person appears by telephone or video 
conferencing shall proceed as required in any other hearing including keeping 
a verbatim record. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Rule 4-107. Consolidation of cases. 
Intent: 
To provide a procedure for hearing motions to consolidate cases and for the 
consolidation of cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to civil and criminal proceedings in all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Motions to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to 
either the lowest numbered or the first filed case. 
(2) Notice of a motion to consolidate shall be given to all parties in each 
action involved, and a copy shall be filed in each case involved. The order 
denying or granting the motion shall also be filed in each file involved. 
(3) In the event a motion to consolidate is granted, the order shall specify 
the case number under which all future papers shall be filed, which shall be the 
lowest of the case numbers involved. Thereafter, that number shall be used 
exclusively for all papers filed, and such papers shall be filed only in the 
designated case file. 
(4) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case shall be heard by the judge 
who was assigned to the lowest numbered of the cases involved, except that for 
good cause shown the presiding judge may assign the case to another judge. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
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78-45c-102 JUDICIAL CODE 
ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping 
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A)16A.L.R.5th 1. Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to §§ 1738A(cX2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 
modify foreign child custody decree under A.L.R.5th 249. 
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Cus- Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child 
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Paren- custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform 
ta f Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2Xb) and 1738A(f Kl), 67 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
A.L.R.5th 1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. 
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify Appealability of interlocutory or pendente 
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) lite order for temporary child custody, 82 
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris- A.L.R.5th 389. 
78-45c-102, Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and nec-
essary care or supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other 
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, 
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an 
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individ-
ual. 
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal 
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. 
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, 
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and 
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The 
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, con-
tractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement. 
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceed-
ing. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to 
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or 
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immedi-
ately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case 
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which 
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of 
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination 
concerning a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody deter-
mination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determi-
nation is made. 
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes, 
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination 
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that 
made the previous determination. 
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency, 
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, 
who: 
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for 
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, 
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child 
custody proceeding; and 
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to 
legal custody under the law of this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a 
child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or 
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village 
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing 
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, enacted by ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (3) and 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, ch. 255, § 36. (4). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par- § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Custody proceeding. not custody issue under this chapter. TB. v. 
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's M.M.J., 908 R2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L.R.4th 1028. 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law. 
This chapter does not govern: 
(1) an adoption proceeding; or 
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical 
care for a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes, 
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this 
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for 
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, Jurisdiction. 
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circum-
stances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this 
843 8 
78-45c-lll JUDICIAL CODE 
electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum 
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, 8 10. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-lll. Taking testimony in another state. 
(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child 
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in 
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or 
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The 
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in 
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon 
which the testimony is taken. 
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state 
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic 
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of 
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an 
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony. 
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this 
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not 
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-lll, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-112. Cooperation between courts — Preservation 
of records. 
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to: 
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing; 
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that 
state; 
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a 
child involved in a pending proceeding; 
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of 
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any 
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and 
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having 
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without 
the child. 
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may: 
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); or 
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a 
custody proceeding in another state. 
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under 
Subsection (2)(b) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other 
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has 
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it 
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may 
be by publication if other means are not effective. 
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this 
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made. 
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a 
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8. Cross-References. — Service of process, 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, Rule 4, U.R.C.R 
78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity. 
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction, 
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2, 
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child 
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate 
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for 
another proceeding or purpose. 
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being 
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this 
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis 
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this 
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be 
accomplished in this state. 
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation 
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter 
committed by an individual while present in this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 9. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-110. Communication between courts. 
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state 
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter. 
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If 
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall 
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision 
on jurisdiction is made. 
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, 
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need 
not be made of that communication. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the 
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication 
and granted access to the record. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record'' means information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or 
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the 
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an 
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest 
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state. 
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under 
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the 
law of this state. 
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records 
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child 
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate 
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall 
forward a certified copy of these records. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-112, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION 
7S-45e-20L Initial child custody jurisdiction, 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child 
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection 
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum 
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one 
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection 
with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the 
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child 
custody determination by a court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
11 
78-45c-202 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appropriate forum. 
Concurrent jurisdiction. 
Preferred forum. 
Appropriate forum. 
Utah district court appropriately retained 
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determi-
nations regarding custody, visitation or other 
matters relevant to the children, where the 
parents were divorced in Utah and, although 
the mother had taken the children to Washing-
ton, that state specifically declined to exercise 
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present 
involvement with the matter. Rawiings v. 
Weiner, 752 R2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
This chapter does not give a preference to the 
"home state." The significant connection or sub-
stantial connection basis comes into play either 
when the home state test cannot be met or as 
an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v. Drake, 
770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Even though a certain state may be the 
"home state," if the child and his family have 
equal or stronger ties with another state that 
other state also has jurisdiction. In re W.D. v. 
Drake, 770 R2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 789 R2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding 
that California was the more appropriate and 
convenient forum to litigate custody and in 
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-
ural parents' petition, where substantial infor-
mation concerning the parents' abilities and 
past history was in California, the mother had 
only recently come to Utah but had lived for 
years in California, and the parents'purpose in 
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In 
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 789 P2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
The state that made the original custody 
determination has exclusive continuing juris-
diction over the custody issue until that state 
loses or declines to exercise its jurisdiction. 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Concurrent jurisdiction. 
Utah had concurrent jurisdiction to modify a 
child custody order from another state when it 
was in the best interest of the child for Utah to 
assume jurisdiction because the child and at 
least one parent had a significant connection 
with Utah and there was substantive evidence 
in Utah pertaining to the child's care, protec-
tion, training, and personal relationships. 
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P..2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Preferred forum. 
In child custody matters, continuing jurisdic-
tion of court in which divorce decree originated 
is intended to remain exclusive, even if other 
states have come to satisfy one or more of the 
criteria of this section, unless the decree state 
decides not to exercise it. Liska v. Liska, 902 
P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Significant connection jurisdiction 
of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B), 5 A.L.R.5th 550. 
Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of 
court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
USCS § 1738(c)(2)(C), 5 A.L.R.5th 788. 
Home state jurisdiction of court under 
§ 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A 
(c)(2)(A), 6A.L.R.5th 1. 
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(D), 6 
A.L.R.5th 69. 
78-45e-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state 
that has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 78-45c-
201 or 78-45c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determina-
tion until: 
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and 
one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant 
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state 
that would assume jurisdiction; 
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; 
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume 
jurisdiction; 
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the 
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child; 
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously 
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and 
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of 
the pending litigation. 
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the 
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition 
the court considers just and proper. 
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or 
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of 
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a 
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the 
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the 
exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more 
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or 
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of 
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying 
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses 
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, 
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the 
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the 
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or 
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this 
chapter. 
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§ 1738A. Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its 
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) 
of this section, any custody determination or visitation determination made 
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. 
(b) As used in this section, the term--
(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a 
court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary 
orders, and initial orders and modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time 
involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as 
parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less 
than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of 
such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as 
part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation 
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made 
subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation determination concerning the same 
child, whether made by the same court or not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has 
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court 
or claims a right to custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States; 
and 
(9) "visitation determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a 
court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and 
temporary orders and initial orders and modifications. 
(c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is 
consistent with the provisions of this section only if--
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and 
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(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within 
six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child 
is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or 
for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State; 
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court 
of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the 
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State 
other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in 
such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has 
been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse; 
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the 
more appropriate forum to determine the custody or visitation of the child, and 
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume 
jurisdiction; or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of 
this section. 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody or 
visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this section 
continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section 
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any 
contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody or visitation determination is made, reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent 
whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has 
physical custody of a child. 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination ot the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if--
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has 
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a 
custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a 
proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is 
exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make 
a custody determination. 
(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a court 
of another State unless the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction 
to modify such determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify 
such determination. 
HISTORY: (Added Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569.) 
(As amended Nov. 12, 1998, P.L. 105-374, § 1, 112 Stat. 3383; Oct. 28, 2000, 
P.L. 106-386, Div B, Title III, § 1303(d), 114 Stat. 1512.) 
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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
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Sullivan v. Sullivan * January 8, 2 0 04 
1 | P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 | JUDGE HANSEN: Case of Wendy Sullivan against Mark 
3 I Allen Sullivan, an action has been filed both in Judge Vaughn's 
4 court and in my court, and thatfs the purpose of our phone call. 
5 And Judge Vaughn, as I understand it, you have entered an order of 
6 temporary custody which was filed December 31st of 2003. 
7 JUDGE VAUGHN: Right. 
8 JUDGE HANSEN: And this court --
9 JUDGE VAUGHN: There are actually two orders here. 
10 The petitioner here, who would be the respondent in your court, 
11 Mark Sullivan, appeared here for an ex parte emergency hearing on 
12 December the 3 0th, and that order was entered. And because it was 
13 an ex parte order, we set a new hearing, which is required under 
14 Illinois law to be set within 10 days of an ex parte hearing. 
15 JUDGE HANSEN: Right. 
16 JUDGE VAUGHN: With notice to the other party. We 
17 held a hearing then on January the 5th. After giving notice to 
18 Wendy Sullivan, she signed for a notice as petitioner here, sent 
19 her a notice by Federal Express that indicates that she signed for 
20 it on January the 2nd at 9:34 a.m. She received her notice of the 
21 second hearing here, and I issued a second order granting 
22 temporary custody to Mark Sullivan here on January the 5th. That 
23 order was filed today. 
24 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. So -- and what's happened in our 
25 I court is that --in fact, let me -- let me indicate to you the 
2 
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Sullivan v. Svllivan * January 8, 2004 
history, and maybe you'll understand --
JUDGE VAUGHN: I have it. I think the petitioner here,! 
attached copies of transcripts from an August... 
JUDGE HANSEN: Hearing. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Hearing, and November the 13th hearing. 
JUDGE HANSEN: And the November 13th hearing was 
before the commissioner, and the August hearing I think was before 
me. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Correct. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Now, as I understand it, complaint --
as I understand it, Miss Sullivan left Illinois on June the 20th 
of the year 2002. She came to Utah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
JUDGE HANSEN: When she came to Utah, she then filed a 
complaint in Utah on July the 26th of this year. That was within 
the six months, and clearly the home state at that point would 
have been Illinois. I think there's no question. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: (Inaudible.) 
JUDGE HANSEN: That complaint sat, and nothing 
20 I happened to it. Then on July 28th, '03, this would have been 
21 approximately seven months later, she, with a different lawyer, 
22 filed a second complaint. That's outside the six months. And in 
23 that particular matter an answer was filed by Mr. King here in 
24 Utah on behalf of Mr. Sullivan, and he raised the jurisdiction 
25 issue. And he also raised the jurisdiction issue in the first 
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1 I complaint to which he filed an answer. 
2 JUDGE VAUGHN: (Unintelligible.) 
3 JUDGE HANSEN: After that happened, then it's my 
4 understanding, and maybe you can help me, on April the 7th of '03, 
5 Mr. Sullivan for the first time filed an action in Illinois. 
6 JUDGE VAUGHN: Correct. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: Which would have been approximately 10 
8 months. 
9 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
10 JUDGE HANSEN: After she came to Utah. 
11 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
12 JUDGE HANSEN: Then new counsel, who filed the second 
13 complaint, made a motion. 
14 JUDGE VAUGHN: She filed an answer here and the 
15 general appearance here. 
16 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. 
17 JUDGE VAUGHN: (Unintelligible.) -- 16th. Wendy 
18 Sullivan did. 
19 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. So Wendy has filed an answer 
20 there and he's filed an answer out here. 
21 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. His answer there contested 
22 jurisdiction, her answer here was a general appearance and did 
23 not --
24 I JUDGE HANSEN: Uh-huh. 
25 I JUDGE VAUGHN: -- did not contest jurisdiction per se, 
19 
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as well. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: She filed her answer here May the 7th 
without counsel. She filed it pro se. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. I was not aware of that. The 
matter came before me in August on a motion to consolidate the two 
Utah cases; that's what the dad wanted, Mr. Sullivan. The wife 
wanted to dismiss the July case because jurisdiction was 
inappropriate. And that was granted, leaving the complaint filed 
July 28th, '03 here, which would be outside the six months and, as 
I understand the statute, then Utah would be the home state. That 
order was issued by the Court. I -- the hearing was August, 
you're correct. And then this matter proceeded before our 
domestic relations commissioner, and a temporary order then I 
think was entered on November the 13th of this year. 
That's where we are, and I was just -- what I was 
wondering is if you were aware of the fact that the first finding 
in Illinois was April the 7th, '03, which is some 10 months after 
she left Illinois? 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I wasn't. And wish I had the 
transcripts of our hearing. We kept a record of both hearings 
here. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I expressed concern about that, that he 
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didn't do anything for 10 months. We had evidence presented here, 
I'm not sure if you had evidence presented there or just had 
arguments of counsel, but he took the stand here and testified 
that his wife kept telling him that she would be home, then she 
didn't come home. Then he went out there and was not allowed to 
see her. And her family told him he'd be arrested if he didn't 
leave. Then he testified that she told him she'd be home by 
Christmas; she didn't come home at Christmas. He then sought 
counsel, who recommended he file an action here. And although 
that troubled me that he waited 10 months, allowed the other state 
to gain home state status, under the UCCJA. He also argued, and 
what I hung my order on was that while the issue was still pending 
and still had jurisdiction, he filed here, he filed here and she 
filed a general appearance; jurisdiction had never been decided 
out there. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: His attorney argued that since Illinois 
was the home state till some other state took over jurisdiction or 
Illinois declined jurisdiction, that Illinois was still the home 
state. I took the position that she had filed a general 
appearance here and an answer here in May, before your August 
hearing; she agreed by that that Illinois was the home state and 
Illinois had jurisdiction until we declined. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Uh-huh. Well, I can see -- I can see 
the problem, and I was not aware of the answer that she filed pro 
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se. When I -- when I heard the case in August, I offered for the 
attorney for Mr. Sullivan to put Mrs. Sullivan en the stand for 
purpose of some testimony. He indicated he didn't feel that was 
necessary because Mr. Sullivan was not here to listen. So I 
received from her lawyer a proffer, which in effect said that when 
she went to Utah, he knew where she was going, and that in fact he 
knew how to get in touch with her, and that she was not trying to 
keep the children from him in any regard. But you know, that's a 
factual issue, and I don't think we can resolve it at this point, 
but I wondered if we could talk about the jurisdiction issue and 
maybe come to some arrangement. And if we can, then I guess the j 
attorneys will just have to work it out, frankly. I don't know 
what the options are, but they'll have to figure it out. 
I took the position, because the second complaint was 
filed in January of '03, which was seven to eight months after she 
came to Utah, and he filed an answer in Utah to all aspects of the 
complaint, although he based in his affirmative defense the 
jurisdiction issue, and dad didn't file anything in Illinois until 
April the 7th, '03, that Utah then would be the home state, and 
therefore jurisdiction was proffered to proceed with the case. 
And indeed it has proceeded here with a temporary order to include 
a temporary custody. I suspect under any circumstance Utah will 
have jurisdiction over all aspects of the divorce, perhaps with 
the exception of custody. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: In your state you only have to live 
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there three months to get jurisdiction for divorce; is that right? 
JUDGE HANSEN: That's right, but --
JUDGE VAUGHN: Here you have to live here 90 days, 
which is true, but you also have to have been separated six months 
before you can get a no fault divorce here. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Ninety days jurisdictional --
JUDGE HANSEN: Well, it's jurisdictional here too in 
terms of the 90 days, but we don't have the requirement that they 
have to be separated for six months. But what I was going by was 
not that, but it was the six months under the Uniform Act to 
determine whether or not it was the home state or whether she had 
been gone for six months and in another state for six months or 
more, and therefore that state would become the home state. I 
could see --
JUDGE VAUGHN: -- argue two things. I'm trying to 
look at the statute here. The first was that he had --he had 
challenged jurisdiction there, and that had never been ruled on, 
so he was not aware he had to file something here until -- I don't 
know if that's right or not, but he was not aware he had to file 
something here until Utah dismissed her case for lack of 
jurisdiction on the custody issue; and second, that she had misled 
him, although he knew where she was. She first told him she was 
going to a family reunion, she didn't return, and told him because 
his family was there, another family had come in, and then she 
8 
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told him she was going to come home for Christmas. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: And based on her misleading him, she 
should not be awarded. There's a -- I can't find a --
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, I don't know if the word 
"surreptitious" is used or not, but at least that's what was 
talked about in that case. And I think if indeed there's a 
surreptitious leaving from one state to go to the other state, 
whatever the definition of that word is in terms of the factual 
predicate to support that finding of fact and conclusion. Like I 
say, out here I had a proffer from her, and his lawyer did not 
want to do any cross-examination of her on that issue. And so my 
only alternative was to accept that proffer. And because of the 
fact that he hadn't filed until 10 months after she left the 
15 J state, then I ruled that Utah had jurisdiction under the Act 
16 J because it was more than six months. 
17 Now, it may be that he could say well, you know, I 
18 didn't know I should have filed. But on the other hand, if under 
19 the circumstances he had counsel back there -- and I don't know if 
20 
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he had counsel or not -- the six months becomes particularly 
critical, and you would assume that he would have seen fit to 
issue --to file, because if he didn't, and Utah is deemed to have 
jurisdiction, that's to his disadvantage, apparently. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Right. 
JUDGE HANSEN: If he does file within the six months, 
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1 I it's clear that Utah does not have jurisdiction, because for that 
2 | six-month period of time Illinois would be the home state. So 
3 I anyway, we -- we -- I -- it looks like we have a tiger by the 
4 I tail. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
JUDGE HANSEN: And I wanted to call and --
JUDGE VAUGHN: A special setting right before 
Christmas to hear this. 
JUDGE HANSEN: I know, yeah. And --
JUDGE VAUGHN: Let me ask you two other questions. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Sure. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: In our statute, under our statute, 
which is 750, Illinois Compiled Statutes Act 35, Section 4, talks 
about jurisdiction. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Right. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Section 4, section 4(d) talks about a 
court, having once attained jurisdiction, retains it until it 
concedes it to another state. He was arguing that Illinois had 
jurisdiction at the time she filed her first one. He had 
pleadings on file attacking that. The plaintiff, she filed a 
second one after the six months, but before any rulings had been 
made about who had jurisdiction. He's arguing that Illinois still 
had jurisdiction because we hadn't conceded it to some other 
state. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
10 
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1 I JUDGE VAUGHN: And while we still had jurisdiction 
2 J before your ruling in August, she filed her general appearance 
3 here, which confirms jurisdiction here. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
5 JUDGE VAUGHN: But as the first question. Second, our^ 
6 statute says that no matter which state has jurisdiction, another 
7 state can decline jurisdiction if a different state is the more 
8 appropriate to hear it. And I was wondering, with him having 
9 lived here and having attended school here initially, if the 
10 witnesses who --in Illinois a major factor in who gets custody is 
11 who was the primary caretaker, who took them to school, attended 
12 meetings, took them to the doctor, that kind of stuff. Would 
13 Illinois be the more appropriate forum to hear that evidence about 
14 who was the primary caretaker when they were still together. 
15 JUDGE HANSEN: In answer to your first question -- I'm 
16 not sure I know the answer, but let me just make an observation. \ 
17 I think within the first six months there's no question Illinois 
18 has jurisdiction, if it's invoked. But if there's no filing in 
19 the home state during the period of the six months under the 
2 0 statute, and it isn't invoked, and then you're living somewhere 
21 else for six months-plus in another state, but the father does not 
22 invoke the jurisdiction of Illinois, then I'm not sure that one 
23 could conclude that Illinois had jurisdiction and that Utah 
24 attempted to usurp it. One may have jurisdiction, but unless the 
25 party invokes it, and that's why that the filing of April 7, '03 
11 
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1 I by him seems to be the critical day. But I understand exactly 
2 I where I thought Illinois was coming from. My thought when I made 
3 the order was, as I've indicated, that I think he had an 
4 obligation to invoke the jurisdiction. And by not invoking it, it 
5 seems to me that you can't file then in April and say Illinois 
6 then had jurisdiction, because it wasn't invoked initially by the 
7 party. 
8 With regard to the other key question you raised, the 
9 other issue, and I think it's a good issue, and I think for you 
10 and me it's probably the most important, aside from the 
11 jurisdiction issue, we got a dad, and I guess his family, that 
12 lives in your area, we got a mother and her family that lives in 
13 Utah. We've got a situation where there are two children. And I 
14 can't -- and you know, frankly, I don't remember if they've been 
15 in school or not. Do you recall that? 
16 JUDGE VAUGHN: They were attending school here in 
17 Thompsonville, which was outside the county. 
18 JUDGE HANSEN: Were they in school in Utah, so that 
19 now when they went back for the Christmas vacation they had to 
2 0 change schools? 
21 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes, they had to re-enroll in 
22 Thompsonville School here again. 
23 JUDGE HANSEN: Well, and I think they lived there -- I 
24 don't know how long they lived in your county, in Hamilton County, 
2 5 but I think it was for a couple of years, maybe more, and she's 
12 
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1 I been out here for about -- about 18 months, and we got the kids i 
2 | school out here. So, you know, it's hard to say which is the mos 
3 I appropriate forum non conveniens. One might be guided by the 
4 Child Custody Jurisdiction Act when they say that jurisdiction fo 
5 the home state purposes is for a period of six months. If indeed 
6 it's outside the six months, then they say no, then you look at --
7 you look at the circumstances that existed. If six months is the 
8 guideline, then back in Illinois we're talking about two-plus 
9 years ago, whereas in Utah you're talking about the last 18 
10 months, except for, you know, I think the kids went back to see 
11 him for Christmas, but I don't remember the details about that. 
12 So the forum non conveniens issue is a hard one for me to 
13 evaluate. What do you think? 
14 JUDGE VAUGHN: Well, I'm not sure I -- I don't 
15 particularly want the case; I'd like it to be your case. But I 
16 also think, even if the case is here, I frankly cannot imagine him* 
17 getting custody because -- and I haven't heard the evidence, but 
18 what little I did hear the other day was he has children from a 
19 previous marriage that he does not have custody of. 
20 JUDGE HANSEN: That's what I understand. 
21 JUDGE VAUGHN: And so I can't imagine he was ever the 
22 primary caretaker even of these new children. But when they were 
23 together as husband and wife -- and wife here in Illinois, I would 
24 expect the (unintelligible) to be that she was the primary 
25 J caretaker and she will still get custody, even here. 
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1 I JUDGE HANSEN: Right. 
2 JUDGE VAUGHN: But since theyfve been -- since they've 
3 been out there, I don't think he's going to have a fairer shot to 
4 even say --he obviously wasn't the primary caretaker, because she 
5 took the children and left -- left the state and went to stay 
6 someplace else, so he obviously wasn't the primary caretaker 
7 there. 
8 JUDGE HANSEN: One thing -- one thing is clear. If 
9 indeed we were --if indeed we're unable to resolve it cost-wise, 
10 attorneys' fees and otherwise, and if indeed both parties are 
11 intent on custody, then at least in Utah there would be a custody | 
12 evaluation. I then -- I've presided over cases where that happens 
13 and the parties are from two different states, and sometimes you 
14 have to get an evaluator in both states and have that evaluator in 
15 each state interview the parties in that state to include the 
16 parties and/or the children, and maybe third parties if it's 
17 appropriate. And then have the two custodial evaluators confer 
18 with one another, and maybe they can come up with a joint 
19 recommendation, and maybe they can't, but that doubles the cost 
2 0 appreciably. I think you and I would both agree if these parties 
21 could just kind of put the emotion behind them and let these 
22 lawyers guide and direct them, and if they could find some common 
23 ground, with the thought in mind of what's the best interests of 
24 the children, both of these parties are better off. 
25 One thing clear is that whoever has custody, there 
14 
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needs to be some sort of visitation arrangement, with the costs of 
travel allocated in an appropriate kind of way so that these 
children have contact and relationship with both mom and dad. 
And. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Let me raise one other issue. As I 
6 | understand it, he has appealed rulings of Utah --
7 I JUDGE HANSEN; He has, that's true. He has 
8 I appealed --
9 JUDGE VAUGHN: If Illinois declines to exercise 
10 jurisdiction or concede the point at this time while an appeal is 
11 pending, the Utah court may very well move to a higher tribunal 
12 out there at the appellate court level to determine -- they may 
13 send it back out here or may determine it should stay out there 
14 and --
15 JUDGE HANSEN: And I don't know what they'll do, but 
16 they have appealed. And at this point it goes to the intermediate 
17 court of appeals, it's not the Supreme Court. I'm told, and I 
18 can't verify this, but I understand that the notice of appeal's 
19 been filed and the gathering documents and getting the necessary 
20 transcripts. The appellate brief has not yet been filed, but soon 
21 will be, I'm told, and then you got the response for brief, and 
22 then it will be set for hearing, and then we'll get an argument. 
23 I don't know how long that will take. It could be months. Who 
24 knows? 
25 j JUDGE VAUGHN: We have three competing --
15 
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JUDGE HANSEN: I know. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: -- policy questions here, like here, 
that's the cases that are supposed to take priority and be heard 
on an expedited basis and that type of thing, but when you have 
something on appeal, even an expedited appeal takes several 
months. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Right, right. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: You used the phrase coming into it, he 
didn't invoke his Illinois jurisdiction here, and I felt the same 
10 thing when we had our ex parte hearing here. His attorney, 
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however, argued that language of the statute is -- does not 
require him to invoke anything; that Illinois has jurisdiction 
until another state determines it has jurisdiction or Illinois 
cedes jurisdiction. You were saying he didn't have to do anything 
here until Utah decided that -- Utah had not decided until August 
the 7th, and he filed it here. That sort of confirms the 
jurisdiction Illinois already had, that argument. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Well, I understand, I understand that 
argument. My only thought would be that the fact of the matter is 
if nothing's filed in the first six months in Illinois, then on 
the seven months, during the seventh month or the eighth month, 
and she files in Utah, given the language of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, it's outside the six months. And under 
that Act, as I understand it, Utah would have -- would presume 
would have jurisdiction. And I don't know how counsel could argue 
16 
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that by Utah filing in January of '01, and him filing in Illinois 
on April the 7th, '03, that Utah then in August of '03 would not < 
be in a position to rule on the jurisdiction issue. Because 
5 
6 
7 
clearly the complaint, the second complaint filed in Utah was 
outside the six months. And if counsel was saying, well, 
notwithstanding that, Illinois had jurisdiction, even though it's 
outside the six months, theoretically, if it's outside the six 
8 months, another state could never take jurisdiction until that 
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state conferred with Illinois. And at that time who do you confer 
with if there's no claim filed? 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Right. 
JUDGE HANSEN: In other words, up until April the 7th 
of '03, who does counsel call or who does the Court call to see if 
Illinois is going to waive jurisdiction or assume jurisdiction? 
It isn't even filed in the court there. That's why I'm saying I 
think invoking the jurisdiction becomes a critical issue. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: He filed when Utah did not have 
jurisdiction, so Illinois is still the home state. And the 
statute says the home state maintains jurisdiction until something 
else happens. But there had never been any ruling on her first 
petition, so that's still pending. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Oh, okay, let me -- let me -- maybe --
maybe this isn't clear. Let me -- let me give you the scenario 
that had occurred here. The first complaint in Utah was filed 
July 26th, '02. No question, Utah did not have jurisdiction at 
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1 I that time, because it!s only a month after she got here. An 
2 | answer was filed to that complaint December the 27th, '02. Okay? 
3 I JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. I have a copy of that. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. Then a second complaint was 
5 filed July 28th, f03, and that's the one I've been talking about. 
6 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: An answer was filed --
8 JUDGE VAUGHN: January 2 8th, »03. 
9 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, January 2 8th, '03, and then an 
10 answer was filed for that one. Then he filed a petition in 
11 Illinois April 7th, '03. Then --
12 JUDGE VAUGHN: When was he served with the second 
13 complaint? 
14 JUDGE HANSEN: Well --
15 JUDGE VAUGHN: Do you know that? 
16 JUDGE HANSEN: -- I could look that up. Let me see. 
17 I've got the file right here. He had counsel, and it may be that 
18 counsel accepted the service. 
19 JUDGE VAUGHN: I don't think they did. That was one 
2 0 of his arguments here, that although he had counsel, they didn't 
21 serve counsel, they had him re-served all over again. 
22 JUDGE HANSEN: They may have done. I can tell you 
23 that that -- if he was re-served all over again, that service 
24 would have been after January 2 8th, *03. They're not challenging 
25 J service -- jurisdiction based on service at all. 
1 O 
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1 I JUDGE VAUGHN: I'm saying that if he wasn't served and 
2 | didn't know there was a new case pending at the time he filed his 
3 I case here, and actually he would have still thought he was 
4 operating under her first Utah filing that did not have 
5 J jurisdiction. 
6 | JUDGE HANSEN: Well. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I don't know if it matters what he 
thought. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Well, that's -- that's a fair question, 
does it matter what he thought. The answer was filed... 
JUDGE VAUGHN: April 28th, I think. 
JUDGE HANSEN: No, no. Well, wait a minute. I got a 
copy of the answer. The answer was filed April the 18th. Well --
JUDGE VAUGHN: After he had filed here. 
JUDGE HANSEN: It was signed by counsel April the 
18th. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. 
JUDGE HANSEN: And he filed there April the 7th. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Correct. Now, when was he served? I 
don't see that. When was -- when was he served with the second 
complaint? I cannot answer that. And it may be the return is not 
in the file. But I don't think that local counsel, Mr. King, who 
represents Mr. Sullivan, has made an issue of that; at least 
before me he hasn't. So I wish I could give that date to you, but 
1 Q 
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1 | I can't. I'm sorry. 
2 I So about what happened was, I think -- I don't know 
3 who filed it for the defendant on April 7th; probably Illinois 
4 counsel. I don't know if you folks have reciprocity or not, and I 
5 don't know if Mr. King is the one here in Utah that filed it or if 
6 it was Illinois counsel who filed the emergency petition during 
7 the * Christmastime. 
8 JUDGE VAUGHN: That was his counsel here. 
9 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. Well, all right. And I don't 
10 know when that counsel was retained or I don't know when --
11 whether or not that counsel ever talked to Utah counsel, I'm not 
12 sure. I don't -- I'm not privy to that --
13 JUDGE VAUGHN: I think counsel here must be talking to 
14 his -- Mr. Sullivan's counsel in Utah, because when they filed 
15 their emergency pleading here, they had attached to it an appendix 
16 with Exhibits A through K. 
17 JUDGE HANSEN: Probably so. , 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: Of all of your pleadings, transcripts, 
19 and orders out there. 
20 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay, well, I'm sure there's contact 
21 then. And counsel -- and there's no question Mr. King out here 
22 believes the Court committed error when I dismissed the first case 
23 and didn't simply consolidate the two cases. And the reason that 
24 Mr. King was concerned is because of the implication that it had, 
25 J I think, on jurisdiction. 
20 
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1 The reason I did what I did is because as of this 
2 filing of the second complaint, it was outside the six months, in 
3 fact, it was approaching seven, maybe beyond seven, and nothing 
4 was filed in Illinois until April the 7th. And -- and I thought 
5 the case back then -- because clearly the second case is outside 
6 I the six months --
7 | JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
8 | JUDGE HANSEN: -- turned on the issue of whether or 
not she was improperly removing the children from the jurisdiction 
and away from her husband. I received the proffer, and that's why 
I said to Mr. King, "Do you wish to cross-examine or examine Mrs. 
Sullivan?" And he said, "No, because Mr. Sullivan is not here to 
listen." And I said, "Well, then all I can do is make a decision 
based on the proffer from her lawyer in Utah," and that was she 
came here with him knowing it, she moved in with her parents, and 
he knew how to get in touch with her, and she decided to stay 
here, and let him know about it, and there was nothing 
surreptitious or under the table to try to get one up on the other 
parent in the case. At least based on the proffer, that's what it 
appeared to me. And under the circumstances, that I felt like 
Utah had jurisdiction and there was no need to contact the 
Illinois court. I probably would have been well advised to have 
done that, because in April it had been filed in your court, and I 
should have called you. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: It looks to me like --do you have an 
PI 
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1 | April the 11th, 2003 filing in the second case? It looks like the 
2 | summons was filed April the 11th, and he was served March the 
3 I 19th, before his filing here. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: He may have been, he may have been. 
5 See, out here, one of the -- the summons was signed January the 
6 27th of f03 on the second case. In terms of the filing, the way 
7 we do it out here, frankly, we have what we call a domestic 
8 relations commissioner, and they handle most of the cases in the 
9 domestic matter. The only time it's going to get to the judge is 
10 if there is not a settlement and itfs got to be tried, or if there 
11 is a legal issue that has to be decided. And that legal issue is 
12 the one that brought the case before me for the first time in 
13 August, the two motions, one to consolidate, and the other to 
14 dismiss the first case. Ifm looking through the file to see if I 
15 can see a March 11th case or filing. What do you think that March 
16 11th filing was? 
17 JUDGE VAUGHN: April the 11th. 
18 JUDGE HANSEN: April 11? What do you think the --
19 JUDGE VAUGHN: It was filed April 11, was a notation 
20 at the (unintelligible) bottom that says --
21 JUDGE HANSEN: Oh, the summons indeed was filed April 
22 11th. 
23 JUDGE VAUGHN: And at the bottom of yours, numbers 
24 843 --
25 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. 
22 
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1 I JUDGE VAUGHN: — 1903, 5:20 p.m 
2 J JUDGE HANSEN: That's right, I got it. 
3 JUDGE VAUGHN: I suspect that's when he was served. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: You're probably right. I do have that, 
5 the original copy. 
6 JUDGE VAUGHN: Right. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: Which --
8 JUDGE VAUGHN: Served with even the second case before 
9 he filed here. 
10 JUDGE HANSEN: That -- yes, if it -- if he was served 
11 in March, that's true, he was served with the second case. 
12 JUDGE VAUGHN: So I guess the bottom line is where do 
13 we go from here? 
14 JUDGE HANSEN: I know, and I've thought about that, 
15 Judge Vaughn. I just don't know. I think there are two general 
16 alternatives. This is what I've come up with: It -- it -- I 
17 guess one option is that the Illinois orders stamd and the Utah 
18 orders stand, and it just reverts back to the lawyers to decide 
19 how to untangle the problem. 
20 JUDGE VAUGHN: I -- I did --
21 JUDGE HANSEN: Or maybe based on not the jurisdiction 
22 issue but the non -- but the forum conveniens issue, you and I 
2 3 agree that it ought to be venued in your court or in my court, and 
24 let the parties proceed. I don't know how you feel about that. 
2 5 I JUDGE VAUGHN: I did have one other thing that I did 
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l in my case, because she wasn't here and I knew there was a Utah 
2 
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18 
19 
case, I set this for a status -- although I granted him temporary 
custody, I set this for a status February 23rd. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Uh-huh. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: One, to allow her more time to make an 
argument here as to what should happen next. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Right. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I guess that's a possibility too, to 
leave it as is, with both orders pending, until the 23rd and 
maybe --
JUDGE HANSEN: And you and I talk --
JUDGE VAUGHN: --it out by that time. If not, then 
one of us could --we could call each other again and determine 
how to proceed. And the other thing would be for the Illinois 
court to back off and say, Utah, this has been litigated in Utah. 
The trial I want is now at the appellate level, and that's a 
better forum of all to determine who has jurisdiction. 
JUDGE HANSEN: What do you recommend? 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I wish she -- did he have counsel out 
2 0 there? He has Mr. King representing him and she has counsel 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
there? 
JUDGE HANSEN: Right. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: She doesn't have counsel here. 
JUDGE HANSEN: That's true. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I'm a little reluctant to force her to 
24 
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come out here and be pro se. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Well, if indeed she needs to come -- or§ 
if indeed that hearing in February occurs, probably, it's up to 
her and up to her lawyer out here, I think she'd be well advised 
to have local counsel in Illinois. I don't know whether or not 
she would do that, I just don't -- I don't know. There are two 
counsel in the case, knowing the case, in Utah. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Now, it may be that the case will say 
Judge Hansen, you made a mistake, you should not have accepted 
jurisdiction. And even if -- even if Illinois were to waive 
jurisdiction and let Utah proceed in a forum non conveniens 
theory, in terms of the electio issue, the Utah appeal could still 
go forward, and see what the Court says. If the Court says that I 
was wrong in the decision, but Illinois acquiesced to Utah for 
reasons we've talked about, at least on this particular issue, 
which is quite unique, we would know in Utah what argument that 
Court believes. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. 
JUDGE HANSEN: But nevertheless, I think Utah would 
still have jurisdiction to proceed and bring everything to an 
ultimate conclusion based upon simply the agreement of counsel 
between --or the agreement of the judges between the two states. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I think I'm inclined to stay Illinois' 
proceedings until the Utah appellate court makes a decision, 
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1 | because if I proceed here or even if you transferred it here, and 
2 I agreed that Illinois had jurisdiction or forum non conveniens 
3 I issues or for whatever reason, she may appeal it here, then we'll 
4 have not only two trial courts --
5 JUDGE HANSEN: I know, you're --
6 JUDGE VAUGHN: -- two appellate courts. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: You'll have two appeals. 
8 JUDGE VAUGHN: (Unintelligible.) 
9 JUDGE HANSEN: If you stay it in Illinois, is that 
10 stay subject to Utah proceeding with the case jurisdictionally, or 
11 would that -- would that stay create a situation where there's not 
12 a jurisdictional resolution, and therefore Utah would be limited 
13 in proceeding the case on the custody and visitation issue? 
14 That's my question. 
15 JUDGE VAUGHN: I'm not sure I understand that. Run 
16 that by me again. 
17 JUDGE HANSEN: Well... 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: We stay our proceedings and Utah 
19 determines that they have jurisdiction, what happens to our case 
2 0 here; is that what you're saying? 
21 JUDGE HANSEN: Well, I'm talking about the interim. 
22 If you stay the case there, and maybe that's okay, then does that, 
23 by implication, or does the nature of the stay maybe specifically 
!4 indicate that you stay the issue there - - o r stay the order there? 
5 I JUDGE VAUGHN: During the pendency of the stay, Utah 
—Garcia & Love Reporting * 8 01-538-23 33 41 
Sullivan v. Sullivan * January 8, 2 0 04 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
remains in effect. 
JUDGE HANSEN: 
! JUDGE VAUGHN: 
Yeah, can -- { 
-- previously entered remains in 
effect 
JUDGE HANSEN: Sure. Can Utah continue then with 
litigation to try to find resolution in this case? In other 
words, litigate the --
JUDGE VAUGHN: Temporary issues. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Sure. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: I think SO. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Your -- your stay probably needs to say 
that then. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. * 
JUDGE HANSEN: Would you agree? 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
JUDGE HANSEN: If you made a stay, if you've stayed 
the order for temporary child custody, and that order provides 
that Utah may continue with the litigation in Utah, and that order 
is -- and we got a copy of it here -- then probably Utah could go 
forward with the domestic case and resolve the issues and see what 
the outcome is. Now --
JUDGE VAUGHN: No question Utah is going to have some 
jurisdiction, because you have jurisdiction over the dissolution 
case no matter what. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Exactly, we have --we have custody 
nn 
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over everything except custody. Now, would the children then stay 
2 in Illinois or would they come back to Utah? 
3 JUDGE VAUGHN: I think they would come back to Utah, 
4 because I would be staying our proceedings here and vacating my 
5 previous temporary order. 
6 JUDGE HANSEN: Right. And then there's a temporary 
7 order here. And I don't know exactly what the visitation 
8 provisions are. Did you get that in the documents that were 
9 submitted to you? 
10 JUDGE VAUGHN: I'm not sure if I do or not. 
11 JUDGE HANSEN: I could... 
12 JUDGE VAUGHN: I think I probably do. They were --
13 they were pretty thorough about what all they attached. 
14 JUDGE HANSEN: Were they? 
15 JUDGE VAUGHN: I do not have the order. I have... 
16 JUDGE HANSEN: Do you have the minute entry dated 
17 November 13, '03? Commissioner David Dillon? That's the minute 
18 entry of the order to show cause for temporary matters. Then a 
19 notice of appeal was filed immediately thereafter, I think. 
20 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. I have an order that says order 
21 to show cause, Commissioner Dillon, Darwin Hansen, filed December 
22 the 5th, if that's the order you're talking --
23 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, that's probably the one. And I 
24 would have signed that because the commissioner recommended it and 
25 I there was no objection to it. 
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JUDGE VAUGHN: By David Dillon. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, that's probably the one. Is 
that 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Dated November the 4th, and then mine 
only has --
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, that's right. Okay, I found it 
in the file. That's the order. What does it say about 
visitation? Does the commissioner work this out? Paragraph 
number 8. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Telephonic visitation each Tuesday, 
Thursday, and Sunday, visitation during Thanksgiving, in paragraph 
10. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. || 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Christmas, half of Christmas vacation, 
in paragraph 11. 
JUDGE HANSEN: Right. And --
JUDGE VAUGHN: That doesn't cover what happens after 
that though, I don't think. There is no order for what happens 
22 I after Christmas, other than the telephonic. 
23 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah. I... I suspect that Mr. King, 
24 who represents her in -- or him in Utah, could talk with Mr. 
25 J Neeley, and if indeed visitation could occur, normally what 
29 
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4 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
5 JUDGE HANSEN: You know, the kids could go back and be 
6 with dad, and then they'd have to share the costs of 
7 transportation. Or, since she moved out here, maybe she ought to 
8 pay it all, but I don't know enough about the facts to make that 
9 judgment. But without question, these little children should have 
10 as much association with mom and dad as they can, given the 
11 geographical distance between them. And if he were to come to 
12 Utah, any of them would spend as much time with him here in Utah, 
13 because he's here, in my judgment. 
14 Now, the fact that the case is on appeal, I don't... 
15 I'm not sure the Utah court can go forward on the issue of custody 
16 until that's resolved, unless --
17 JUDGE VAUGHN: On temporary matters? 
18 JUDGE HANSEN: Well, I think on temporary matters it 
19 can. Don't you? 
20 JUDGE VAUGHN: You could reach an ultimate — I think 
21 you could on temporary matters, but I don't think you could on 
22 ultimate. 
23 JUDGE HANSEN: Not unless --
24 JUDGE VAUGHN: The jurisdictional issue is determined 
25 J by the appellate court. 
-an 
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1 I JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, not unless both parties agreed 
2 I and counsel decided not to pursue the appeal. 
3 JUDGE VAUGHN: The only thing out of this whole 
4 procedure that troubles me, I guess, is the evidentiary issues on 
5 custody. I said before, if they went to school here for two years 
6 and lived here for two years, physical custody here in Harris, one 
7 parent or the other, (unintelligible) teachers and daycare workers 
8 to say who was the primary caretaker for the child, and I don't 
9 know how that could happen out there, because out there he's not 
10 been -- I mean, here she would call the school people or daycare 
11 people or baby-sitters or somebody to say Wendy always came to 
12 parent-teacher conferences or Wendy came to the Christmas program, 
13 or whoever the parent was. It seems like most of the witnesses 
14 that would be available for a custody hearing would be here. 
15 JUDGE HANSEN: It -- it may be that: if custody is an 
16 issue that both parties wish to pursue to ultimate conclusion, 
17 that very little can be done until our court of appeals rules. 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
19 JUDGE HANSEN: But if -- if the order in Illinois is 
20 stayed, specifically allowing the children to come back and 
21 allowing the case to go forward on temporary matters of custody 
22 and visitation, and then maybe on the merits with respect to other 
23 issues in the divorce, it may be that counsel ought tc hear it and 
24 find a resolution on many of those issues, such that if our court 
25 J says that my ruling is in error, then -- then custody would have 
Garcia & Love* Reporting * 8 01-538-23 46 
Sullivan v. Sullivan * January 8, 2 0 04 
1 I to be determined in Illinois. If the court says no, you were not, 
2 | then I suspect custody could be determined here in Utah. 
3 I JUDGE VAUGHN; Okay. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: If all other issues were resolved and 
5 the only thing unresolved was custody, that might be helpful. And 
6 moreover, if the parties, with the benefit of counsel, can make 
7 their way through the emotion, and obviously the anger and 
8 mistrust that is existing between them, and they resolve some of 
9 these other issues, it may create a situation where they can 
10 resolve custody. I don't know. You hope that, but you and I both 
11 know that doesn't always happen. 
12 JUDGE VAUGHN: I will then -- let me ask you a final 
13 question on how this will all take place. 
14 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. 
15 JUDGE VAUGHN: The time frame for if I -- it's 5:00 
16 here, it's 5:20 here. 
17 JUDGE HANSEN: Yeah, I'm sorry to keep you after work. 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. And we have a quarterly circuit-
19 wide judges meeting tomorrow. Ifm not sure when I can do it. I 
20 will be here tomorrow afternoon. If I do an order tomorrow day in 
21 the proceeding here and vacating the temporary order that Ifve 
22 entered here, pending the resolution of the Utah appeal, a time 
23 frame for her to -- for the Utah order would be in effect then, 
24 temporary custody order, when would she be coming to get the 
25 children, or when would I make this effective, this weekend or 
to 
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next weekend or? 
2 I JUDGE HANSEN: It's hard to say. I -- I would think 
3 I this as a general proposition: I think it's important that the 
4 kids get back in school as soon as they can. And if you were to 
5 take those steps, I think you're going to want to probably say in 
6 the next week to 10 days, and probably seven, date certain. And 
7 if your order is that she needs to go to Illinois to pick up the 
8 kids, I'd go down the road maybe a week or 10 days max and say 
9 she's to appear at that time, pick up the kids, and she can bring 
10 them back to Utah. I mean, that's -- seems reasonable to me. But 
11 on the other hand, if -- if it's done within a day or two, the air 
12 fares are going to be the most expensive. If she's gone a week or 
13 so, maybe that will work out, but if it's much longer, then --
14 JUDGE VAUGHN: The other thing --
15 JUDGE HANSEN: -- you're getting the kids --
16 JUDGE VAUGHN: --Mr. Sullivan's attorney here --
17 JUDGE HANSEN: I know. 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: -- is a very effective and aggressive 
19 domestic relations lawyer, and if I wait 10 days he may very well 
2 0 have an appeal filed here. That will complicate the matter. 
21 JUDGE HANSEN: Well, then do it as soon as you wish, 
22 do it as soon as you wish, call --
23 JUDGE VAUGHN: That would make it effective 
24 immediately, and I don't know how she'll get v/ord of that or know 
2 5 to come here to --
33 
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1 | JUDGE HANSEN: Well, what I will -- this is what 
2 j happened, for me. I received a pleading filed by her lawyer here 
3 asking me to give you a call. 
4 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes, I have a copy of that, the order 
5 here, from Mr. Sullivan's lawyer here, faxed me that this 
6 morning. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. And when I got that, I then got 
8 both lawyers on the telephone, Mr. Neeley and Mr. King here in 
9 Utah, and I said I -- I have this request, and Ifm willing to call 
10 Judge Vaughn and talk with him, but I want both lawyers to know 
11 and to feel comfortable with my doing that. And Mr. King said 
12 that's okay, and so did Mr. Neeley. And I told them that I would 
13 file a minute -- prepare a minute entry, and I would send them a 
14 copy of the minute entry. They said, well, in addition to that, I 
15 think both of them agree, based upon a couple of cases in Utah, 
16 asking if I could, you know, put this on the record and have a 
17 verbatim record. And 1 said I can do that, but I think those 
18 cases simply require that I take notes and keep the notes. But on 
19 the other hand, if Judge Vaughn has no objection, Ifm willing to 
20 put it on the record. 
21 JUDGE VAUGHN: Do you have an electronic recording 
22 record or do you have a court reporter there taking --
23 JUDGE HANSEN: No, no court reporter; it's a video 
24 electronic record. I do have my clerk here because I need her to 
25 J do a minute entry, and she's very good at it. 
34 
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1 ! JUDGE VAUGHN: I will tomorrow -- I won't do it 
2 | tonight, and I have a meeting in the morning from 8:00 until noon, 
3 | I have to come back here at 1:30 to take a plea on a drug case, so 
4 I I will be here at 1:30, and I will make an entry at 1:30, or as 
5 soon as the plea is taken, staying these proceedings here pending 
S the outcome of the Utah appeal, and vacating our previous 
7 temporary order and deferring to Utah for it. 
8 JUDGE HANSEN: Could you fax that --
9 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yeah, I think I'll put in my order that 
10 (unintelligible) completing jurisdiction pending the outcome of 
11 the Utah appeal. 
12 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. Let's -- then let me give you my 
13 fax number, and I would appreciate it if you would fax that to me. j^  
14 JUDGE VAUGHN: All right. 
15 JUDGE HANSEN: Then what I will do is prepare a minute 
16 entry for our conversation, and then I will attach your order 
17 vacating -- staying and vacating, and then I will send to both 
18 counsel here in Utah my minute entry and your order, and I'll send 
19 you a copy of my minute entry. Does that make sense? 
2 0 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
21 JUDGE HANSEN: And my fax number is area code 
22 (801) 447-3880. 
2 3 JUDGE VAUGHN: What is your regular phone number? 
24 JUDGE HANSEN: My regular phone number, area code 
25 (801) 447-3840. And you'll get my clerk when you call that 
1 Garcia & Love Reporting * 801-538-23 50 
Sullivan v. Sullivan * January 8, 2004 
1 I number. If in fact I am not here --or she is not here and you 
2 I want to call me directly, it's 447-384... 
3 1 THE CLERK: Three. 
4 JUDGE HANSEN: Three. That will -- that rings the 
5 phone on my desk. 
6 JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. 
7 JUDGE HANSEN: Now, let me tell you, I -- next week 
8 I'm going to be out of town, we have a vacation for next week, so 
9 I'll be gone as of tomorrow night, but I'll be back a week from 
10 Monday. 
11 JUDGE VAUGHN: All right. I travel, I'm -- this is my 
12 home county, but I'm only here two days a week. We have a 
13 12-county circuit that I travel. 
14 JUDGE HANSEN: Oh, I see. 
15 JUDGE VAUGHN: And I am in other counties two days a 
16 week. 
17 JUDGE HANSEN: Okay. 
18 JUDGE VAUGHN: The number you call, we have an 
19 answering machine here with that number, but I carry a cell phone 
20 with me, I almost sleep with it, but that number is (618) 
21 925-1162. 
22 JUDGE HANSEN: (618) 925? 
23 JUDGE VAUGHN: 1162. 
24 JUDGE HANSEN: 1162. 
25 JUDGE VAUGHN: Yes. 
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JUDGE HANSEN: All right. Judge Vaughn, thank you 
very much. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Thank you. 
JUDGE HANSEN: It's been great --
JUDGE VAUGHN: How far are you from Salt Lake City? 
JUDGE HANSEN: Well, we're a bedroom community. We're 
probably maybe 15 to 18 miles. 
JUDGE VAUGHN: Okay. 
• * * 
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I, Lisa Collman, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary-
Public within and for the County of Davis and the State of Utah, 
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9 I time and place herein set forth, and were taken down by me in 
shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my 
direction and supervision. 
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That the foregoing 3 6 pages contain a true and correct 
transcription of my shorthand notes so taken. 
In witness thereof, I have hereunto transcribed my name and 
affixed my seal this 22nd day of January, 2004. 
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APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS <*«*• A ^ a u l c o S t t D;$T 
FIFTH DISTRICT 
MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN, ) Appeal from the 
) Circuit Court of 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Hamilton County. 
v. ) No. 03-F-5 
WENDY SULLIVAN, ) Honorable 
) Barry I,. Vaughan, 
Respondent-Appellee, ) Judge, presiding. 
R U L E 23 O R D E R 
Petitioner, Mark Sullivan, appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider the order 
entered by the circuit court of Hamilton County setting aside a preliminary injunction that 
gave him temporary custody of the parties' children. The appeal is pursuant to Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 111. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm. 
Mark Sullivan and Wendy Sullivan, respondent, were married on August 26, 1995, 
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the course of their marriage, two children were born 
of the parties, namely: Brett Vemon Sullivan, born April 2,1996, and Sydney June Sullivan, 
bom July 18, 1997. The parties became residents of Illinois in December 1999 and resided 
in West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois. In June 2001, they moved to Tbompsonville, 
Hamilton County. Illinois. In June 2002, Wendy took the children to Utah to visit her 
family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2 that she was not returning to 
Illinois and intended to terminate the parties' marriage. 
On September 26, 2002, Wendy filed in Utah a complaint for the dissolution of the 
parties' marriage and for the custody of the children. On December 26, 2002, Mark entered 
1 
54 
his appearance and moved to dismiss the Utah proceedings. On January 28,2003, Wendy 
opened a new file in Utah and? for a second time, filed for the dissolution of the parties' 
marriage and for the custody of the children On April 7, 2003, Mark filed a petition for the 
custody of the children in Hamilton County, Illinois, and on April 22, he filed an answer and 
objection to jurisdiction in the second dissolution proceeding initiated by Wendy in Utah. 
On May 5, 2003, Wendy entered her pro se appearance in the Illinois action filed by Mark. 
Wendy also filed an answer in which she stated that she had previously filed a complaint for 
the dissolution of the marriage and for the custody of the children in Davis County, Utah, in 
January 2003. On May 15,2003, Utah judge Honorable Darwin C. Hansen granted Wendy's 
motion to dismiss her original complaint. On August 7, 2003, Judge Hansen denied Mark's 
request to reinstate Wendy's original complaint and to consolidate it with her second 
complaint for dissolution. Judge Hansen also found that Utah had jurisdiction to decide the 
dissolution and custody issues presented and referred the case to a commissioner for further 
proceedings. Judge Hansen's decision determining that Utah had jurisdiction over this matter 
is currently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals (Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. 20030957 
(docketed November 26, 2003)). 
On November 13, 2003, a hearing was conducted before Commissioner David S. 
Dillion pertaining to the custody of the parties' children, child support, and visitation. 
Wendy was present and was represented by counsel. Mark was not present but was 
represented by counsel. On December 5, 2003, the Utah court entered an order granting 
Wendy temporary custody of the minor children and granting Mark visitation during the 
Christmas season, Mark exercised his right to visitation pursuant to the Utah order and 
returned the children to Illinois. While the children were still in Illinois, Mark filed an ex 
parte emergency petition for temporary custody in the State of Illinois. Judge Bany 
Vaughan found that Utah's temporary custody order was not entitled to full faith and credit, 
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because Utah did not have proper jurisdiction over the child custody issue in the case. As 
a result, the court granted the ex parte request and scheduled the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction for Januaiy 5,2004. On Januaiy 2,2004, Wendy was served with the petition and 
a notice of the hearing. On January 5,2004, Wendy was found in default, and a preliminary 
injunction was entered granting Mark temporary custody of the children. 
On January 8, 2004, counsel in Utah for Wendy and Mark arranged for a telephone 
conference between Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughan pursuant to section 7(c) of the 
Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Act); 
"If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding 
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court 
assumed jurisdiction[,] it shall stay tfie proceeding and communicate with the court 
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in 
the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance with 
Sections 20 through 23 of this Act If a court of this State has made a custody 
judgment before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another statefj 
jt shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a 
proceeding was commenced in another state after tl assumed jurisdiction^] it shall 
likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the most 
appropriate forum." 750 ILCS 35/7(c) (West 2002).l 
lrrhc Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has since been repealed and replaced, 
effective January 1,2004, by the Unifonn Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(Pub. Act 93-108, art. 1, §§101, 404, eff. January 1, 2004 (repealing 750 ILCS 35/1 etseq. 
and adding 750 ILCS 36/101 ct seq.)). Motions or other requests for relief made in child-
custody proceedings or to enforce child-custody determinations that had been commenced 
before the effective date of the new act are governed by the law in effect at the time the 
3 
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After the telephone conference, Judge Vaughan made the following entry m the case 
record sheet: 
"Court receives telephone call % 4:30 p.m. from Judge Darwin C. Hanson [sic], 2* 
Judicial District, Utah; a record of the proceedings was made by Judge Hansen; judges 
discuss jurisdictional issues & fact of two contrary terapforary] cust[ody] orders; 
teleconference per 15 [sic] ILCS 35/§§ 7 & 8; judges agree that Illinois court will stay 
per § 7 its proceedings pending decision from Utah Appellate Court. Preliminary 
injunction entered granting temporary custody to father is vacated effective 1-12-04 
at noon per § 7(c). In staying these proceedings, the IL & UT courts agree that the 
appeal pending in Utah is controlling; the IL court is not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] 
conceding jurisdiction but deferring to the Utah Appellate Court; there is no question 
Utah has jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings; Utah had a temporary custody 
order in place at the time the IL tempforary] custody was entered; the court is also 
troubled by [the] fact Mark f(]husband[)] did not file a custody action in IL until 4-7-
03, 9 months after wife left, 6 months after wife filed proceedings in Utah, & 4 
month[sJ after husband filed an answer in Utah; had husband filed custody in IL 
sooner, there is no question IL would be the home state; at this point in the 
proceedings Judge Vaughan & Judge Hansen agree this is a matter best left to the Utah 
court of appeals." 
The Act was adopted in both Illinois and Utah. 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002); 
Utah Code Ann, §78-45c-101 et seq. (2002), The Act seeks to avoid jurisdictional 
competitions and conflicts between states, to protect children's best interests, and to 
discourage forum shopping. In re Marriage ofRizza, 237 III. App. 3d 83, 87, 603 N.E.2d 
134, \3% (1992). Accordingly, the Act achieves certainty by providing that the first state to 
motions or other requests were made. 
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exercise jurisdiction has the exclusive right to proceed. In re Marriage o/Kneitz, 341 TIL 
App. 3d 299,304,793 N.E.2d 988, 993 (2003); see also In re Marriage ofLudwinski, 329 111. 
App. 3d 1149, 1154. 769 N.E 2d 1094, 1099 (2002). Specifically, section 7(a) of the Act 
provides as follows: 
"A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of 
filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a 
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act, 
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a 
more appropriate forum or for other reasons." 750ILCS 35/7(a) (West 2002). 
Similarly, section 14 states: 
"The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification 
judgment of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory 
provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual 
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this judgment 
has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar 
to those of this Act." 750 ILCS 35/14 (West 2002). 
Before resolving this matter, it is important to identify what is and what is not before 
the court. The limited issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dissolving 
the preliminary injunction it had previously entered. Controverted facts or the merits of the 
case are not d^cid^d where, as here, an interlocutory appeal is brought pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 III. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Yates v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 193 HI. 
App. 3d 431, 437, 549 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (1990). The only issue in such an appeal is 
"whether there was a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court granting or 
denying the relief sought" Yates, 193 TU. App. 3d at 437, 549 N.E.2d at 1014; see also 
Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 111. App. 3d 959, 962, 614 N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16 
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(1993). 
Mark frames the issue as follows: "Whether the Illinois circuit court erred in deferring 
subject matter jurisdiction to the State of Utah?" The court did not decline subject matter 
jurisdiction in the case. If it had, Mark's petition would have been dismissed, The court 
specifically found that Illinois was "not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] conceding jurisdiction" 
to Utah. Judge Vaughan decided to wait until the Utah appellate court decided Mark's appeal 
of the Utah trial judge's decision regarding jurisdiction. We believe that Judge Vaughanfs 
actions were consistent with the general purpose of the Act: 
"to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in child 
custody matters; [to] promote cooperation with the courts of other States; [to] assure 
that child custody litigation occurs in the State where the child and his or her family 
has the closest connection, and where evidence of the child's care, protection, 
training!,] and personal relationships is most readily available; to discourage 
controversies over child custody matters; to deter abductions; and to avoid relitigation 
of child custody decisions of other States." Richardson v. Richardson, 255 III. App. 
3d 1099, 1100-01, 625 N.E.2d 1122, U23 (1993). 
Mark wisely appealed the Utah trial judge's ruling on jurisdiction. If he had failed to 
appeal the Utah decision, he would not be able to argue in Illinois that the Utah trial court had 
erred on the jurisdictional issue. See In re Marriage ofArulpragasam & Eisele, 304 111. App. 
3d 139, 146, 709 N.E.2d 725, 731 (1999); In re Marriage ofMauro, 187 111. App. 3d 794, 
797, 543 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1989). We also find that the Illinois trial judge in this case made 
a sound decision in vacating the preliminary injunction and effectively staying the Illinois 
action until the Utah appellate court renders a decision on Mark's appeal. We agree that this 
was the most effective and efficient way to fulfill the purpose of the Act. 
6 
Affirmed. 
DONOVAN, J., with HOPKINS and WELCH, JJ., concumng. 
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